The Byzantine agreement problem requires a set of n processes to agree on a value sent by a transmitter, despite a subset of b processes behaving in an arbitrary, i.e. Byzantine, manner and sending corrupted messages to all processes in the system. It is well known that the problem has a solution in a (an eventually) synchronous message passing distributed system iff the number of processes in the Byzantine subset is less than one third of the total number of processes, i.e. iff n > 3b + 1. The rest of the processes are expected to be correct: they should never deviate from the algorithm assigned to them and send corrupted messages. But what if they still do?
Introduction
Pease, Shostak and Lamport introduced the Byzantine model in their landmark papers [1, 2] . A Byzantine process is defined as a process that can arbitrarily deviate from the algorithm assigned to it and send corrupted messages to other processes. They considered a synchronous model and proved that agreement is achievable with a fully connected network if and only if the number of Byzantine processes is less than one third of the total number of processes. Dolev extended this result to general networks, in which the connectivity number is more than twice the number of faulty processes [3] . The early work on Byzantine agreement is well summarized in the survey by Fischer [4] .
Several approaches have been proposed to circumvent the impossibility of reaching Byzantine agreement in an asynchronous context [5] . The eventually synchronous model was presented in [6] : an intermediate model between synchronous and asynchronous models, allowing some limited periods of asynchrony. Eventual synchrony is considered weak enough to model real systems and strong enough to make Byzantine agreement solvable. Alternative approaches rely on randomized algorithms [7] [8] [9] [10] . As Karlin and Yao showed in [11] , the one third bound is still a tight bound for randomized Byzantine agreement algorithms.
We show in this paper that it is possible to solve Byzantine agreement deterministically even if, beyond the b (< n/3) Byzantine processes, some of the other processes also send corrupted messages, as long as they do not send them to all. We show that this is possible deterministically, and even in an eventually synchronous model. We compute the exact number of processes that can commit such partial Byzantine faults, besides those that commit classical Byzantine failures, while still solving Byzantine agreement. For pedagogical purposes, we mainly focus in the main paper on the synchronous context and non-signed messages [1, 12] . We discuss signed messages and the eventually synchronous context in Section 4 and the Appendices.
We generalize the classical Byzantine model and consider that Byzantine failures might be partial. This generalization is, we believe, interesting in its own right. In each communication step, some of the processes might send corrupted messages to a subset of the processes. The classical Byzantine failure model corresponds to the extreme case where this subset is the entire system. So we consider a system of n processes, of which m can be partially faulty. The processes communicate with each other directly through a complete network. We assume that each partially faulty process p is associated with up to d (< n − 1) Byzantine communication links. Such a process p is said to be d-faulty. The d Byzantine links are dynamic: they may be different in different communication rounds. A d-faulty process somehow means that the local computation of the processes remains correct: only the communication links related to the faulty processes are controlled by the adversary -during specific rounds. This captures practical situations where processes experience possibly temporary bugs in specific parts of their code or communication links. From the component failure model's view, our generalization is orthogonal to those of [13] [14] [15] .
We establish tight bounds on Byzantine agreement in terms of (a) the number of processes to which corrupted messages can be sent and (b) time complexity, i.e. the number of rounds needed to reach agreement. Besides basic distributed computing tools like full information protocols and scenario arguments, we also introduce and make use of a new technique we call "View-Transform" which basically enables processes to locally correct partial Byzantine failures and transform a classical Byzantine agreement algorithm into one that tolerates more than 1/3 failures. Interestingly, this transformation only requires adding a couple more rounds to a classical Byzantine agreement algorithm, i.e., its time complexity does not grow with the number of partial Byzantine faults tolerated. In fact, by tolerating more than 1/3 Byzantine failures, our algorithm can be faster than classical algorithms in the following sense. In situation where 1/3 processes are Byzantine, a deterministic Byzantine algorithm [1] need to wait for all correct processes to communicate, even if some of the communication links between processes have very large delays. In our case, these highly delayed links will be viewed as partial failures, and can be totally tolerated.
For a system with b Byzantine processes and m "d-faulty" processes, Byzantine agreement can be solved among n processes iff n > max{2m + d, 2d + m, b} + 2b. There is thus a clear trade-off between the number b of Byzantine failures we can tolerate, the number m of partial Byzantine failures and d. For instance, the system could tolerate 1/6 fraction of "1-faulty" processes in addition to (1/3 − ) Byzantine processes. Tolerating fewer classical Byzantine failures would enable us to tolerate many more partial Byzantine ones. For example, if b = 0, we can tolerate up to n/2 "1-faulty" processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our partial Byzantine failure model and recalls the Byzantine agreement problem. Section 3 presents our Byzantine agreement algorithm in the synchronous context. Section 4 proves the resilience optimality of our algorithm and also discusses the case where messages are signed. Section 5 discusses the time optimality of the algorithm. We conclude by reviewing related work in Section 6. For space limitations, we defer the discussion on early decision and eventual synchrony, as well as some correctness proofs to the optional appendices.
Model and Definitions

Synchronous computations
We first consider a synchronous message passing distributed system P of n processes. Each process is identified by a unique id p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. As in [1, 16] , a synchronous computation proceeds in a sequence of rounds. * The processes communicate by exchanging messages round by round within a fully connected point-to-point network. In each round, each process p first sends at most one message to every other process, possibly to all processes, and then p receives the messages sent by other processes. The communication channels are authenticated, i.e. the sender is known to the recipient. Following [1] , we consider oral messages † with the following properties: (a) every message sent is delivered; (b) the absence of a message can be detected. In the system, there is a designated process called transmitter which has an initial input value from some domain V to transmit to all processes.
We model an algorithm as a set of deterministic automata, one for each process in the system. Thus, the actions of a process are entirely determined by the algorithm, the initial value of the transmitter and the messages it receives from others.
Failure model
In short, a d-faulty process p may lie to other processes: in each round, p can send to a subset of d processes Byzantine messages, i.e., messages that differ from those that p has to send following its algorithm. We assume that up to m ( 0) of the processes are partial controlled by the adversary (these processes can send Byzantine messages to d (< n − 1) processes) and up to b ( 0) are fully controlled by the adversary. By convention, if m = 0, we assume d = 0 to make our condition simpler to state.
In each round, the adversary chooses up to d communication links from each partial controlled process that could carry Byzantine messages, while the fully controlled processes could send Byzantine messages. We call an instance of our system of n processes with m d-faulty processes and b Byzantine processes as a (n, m, d, b)-system. We refer to the correct processes as well as the d-faulty ones as non-Byzantine processes in this paper.
Full information algorithms
We consider full information algorithms in the sense of [1, 18, 19] . Every process transmits to all processes its entire state in each round, including everything it knows about all values sent by other processes in the previous round. We introduce in the following a collection of notations (a slight extension of [18] ) to establish and prove our results.
We use P l:k to denote the set of strings of process identifiers in P of length at least l and at most k, and P k to denote the set of strings of length k. An empty string has length 0. We use P + to denote non-empty strings of symbols in P and P * to denote all strings including the empty one. We always refer to p 0 as the transmitter in the Byzantine agreement problem, and V as the domain of values which processes wish to agree on. For convenience, we assume that {⊥, 0, 1} ∈ V where ⊥ refers to the empty value.
A k-round scenario σ (in a (n, m, d, b)-system P ) describes an execution of the algorithm. Intuitively σ describes a communication scheme admissible for the (n, m, d, b)-system. The scenario is determined by the initial value of each process and the communication scheme. Given scenario σ,
• σ(p 0 ) is the initial value of transmitter p 0 .
• There are sets B(σ) and D(σ) of processes (denoting the set of Byzantine and d-faulty processes, respectively) such that:
-for every process p ∈ D(σ) and round l ( k), there is a set T of at most d processes such that for every q ∈ P \ T and every w ∈ p 0 P l−2 we have σ(wpq) = σ(wp). Note that σ(wpq) = σ(wp) for some strings w of length l and process q means that q receives a Byzantine message from p in round l + 1.
Throughout this paper, we use σ to represent a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with transmitter p 0 , d-faulty processes in D(σ) and Byzantine processes in B(σ).
denotes the view of p with respect to scenario σ p0...pi , and σ p0...pi q1...qj denotes the view of q j from q 1 . . . q j with respect to scenario σ p0...pi .
Let U k be the set of mappings from p 0 P k−1 into V. Any k-round algorithm F defined in a (n, m, d, b)-system may be defined on the set of all views; namely as a function F : U k → V.
The Byzantine agreement problem
We address in this paper the problem of Byzantine agreement (also called the Byzantine generals problem in [1] ). Each process has an output register which records the outcome of the computation. We assume that the initial value of this register is nil / ∈ V and that this output register can be written at most once.
Let F be a k-round algorithm and the output is a value in V. Then we say that F solves Byzantine agreement if, for each k-round scenario σ and every process p ∈ P , the following conditions hold:
• Termination: Every non-Byzantine process p outputs value F (σ p ).
• Validity: If the transmitter p 0 is non-Byzantine, then every non-Byzantine process p outputs the initial value of p 0 , i.e.
• Agreement: Any two non-Byzantine processes p and q have the same output, i.e.
The Byzantine Agreement Protocol
In this section, we present an algorithm we call BA++ (Algorithm 3) for solving Byzantine agreement within a (n, m, d, b)-system. We adopt the description style of [18] for our algorithm. The main theorem is as follows. At a very high level (Figure 1 ), the idea underlying algorithm BA++ is the following. The processes exchange their messages in a full information manner during b + 3 rounds. ‡ According to our model, the views obtained at each process contains both partial failures and Byzantine failures. The first step of BA++ is to correct the partial failures. This is challenging because the partial faults introduced in the early rounds would still exist in the subsequent rounds. We address this problem by an algorithm we call View-Transform (Algorithm 2): this transforms a view with partial failures into a view without partial failures. Another challenge is to ensure that the views (that resulted from a same scenario) still belong to a same scenario after View-Transform. This is addressed by iterations of Local-Majority (Algorithm 1). After applying View-Transform to the original view, the majority algorithm (OM ) of Lamport [1] (or any (b + 1)-round simultaneous Byzantine agreement algorithm) can be employed to compute a output.
Proof: The first part of the lemma follows directly from the algorithm, so we only need to show the second part.
If m = d = 0 and b = 0, the lemma follows directly since there are no failures. In the following, we prove the lemma in the case that m = 0 or b = 0.
If p i+1 is correct, then there are at least
Now consider p i . If p i is correct, then all correct processes will contribute a value σ(p 0 . .
If p i is d-faulty, then all correct processes except the ones that receive wrong values from p i will contribute a value σ(p 0 . . . 
p i ).
We show that the output of View-Transform for different processes actually comes from a single scenario of a (n, 0, 0, b)-system for which the OM algorithm guarantees Byzantine agreement in (b + 1) rounds. We prove this by introducing the following Scenario-Transform. ‡. We discuss how to reduce that number of rounds in Section 5. From the claim, we see that in ST (σ) every non-Byzantine process always sends correct messages to other processes. So ST (σ) is a scenario of (n, 0, 0, b)-system with Byzantine processes B(σ). Therefore, if p 0 is non-Byzantine in σ then p 0 is also correct in ST (σ). Because the value of σ(p 0 ) for non-Byzantine process p 0 is never changed in ST , ST (σ)(p 0 ) = σ(p 0 ).
With all the lemmas above, now we can give a proof of Theorem 1. Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose σ is a (b + 3)-round scenario for (n, m, d, b)-system. By Lemma 2 above, σ = ST (σ) with respect to LM 3 is a (b + 1)-round scenario of (n, 0, 0, d)-system. Since V T p (σ p ) = σ p for every non-Byzantine process p, OM (V T p (σ p )) are equal for all non-Byzantine process which proves the agreement property. Moreover, if p 0 is non-Byzantine, then OM (V T p (σ p )) = ST (σ)(p 0 ). This shows the validity property. Therefore, the theorem is proved.
Resilience Lower Bounds
We show here that our BA++ algorithm is optimal with respect to resilience; namely, n > max{2m + d, 2d + m, b} + 2b is a tight bound to reach Byzantine agreement. If m = d = 0, this bound is n > 3b which is tight by [1] . So in this section, we assume that m, d > 0 and show that it is impossible to achieve Byzantine agreement if n 2m + d + 2b or n 2d + m + 2b. i. For every p ∈ P , k ∈ K, q ∈ P \K, let
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H, i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K, p ∈ P , q ∈ P \K, w ∈ p 0 P * , define the following values recursively on the length of w: It is easy to check that α is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in H and Byzantine processes in J, and that β is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine processes in I.
In the construction,
Since p 0 is a non-Byzantine process in both α and β, according to Byzantine agreement we have
However, it is a contradiction to that F (α k ) = F (β k ) for all k ∈ K. The lemma is proved. The proof for Lemma 4 is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. Due to space limitation, we defer the proof to Appendix I.
Taking together the algorithm in Section 3 and the lemmas above, we have the following theorem. 
Signed messages
So far we have assumed oral message. We now discuss the case where processes could send signed messages [1] . In this case, we also have a tight bound on the number of processes for reaching Byzantine agreement. Following [1] , a signed message satisfies the following two properties:
1) The signature of a non-Byzantine process cannot be forged and any alteration of its content can be detected. 2) Every process can verify the authenticity of a signature. Formally, suppose σ is a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b) 
p outputs the majority value of S.
We present an algorithm called SBA++ (Algorithm 4) for solving Byzantine agreement with signed message. Due to space limitation, we move the proof of Algorithm SBA++ and the following theorem into Appendix II. 
Time Optimality
In this section, we investigate the time complexity of reaching Byzantine agreement for a (n, m, d, b)-system. If m = 0, the communication rounds needed to reach Byzantine agreement is b + 1 by [18] . So in this section, we assume m > 0. We show that in some cases (n max{2m + 2d, b + 1} + 2b) the lower bound of the number of rounds for reaching Byzantine agreement is b + 2, and in other cases (e.g. b = 0) the lower bound is b + 3.
We first show that a (b + 2)-round algorithm is available if n max{2m + 2d, b + 1} + 2b. In this case we have the following 2-round Local-Majority algorithm. 
Lemma 5. Suppose n 2m + 2d + 2b and n > 2b + 1.
Proof: The first part of the lemma follows directly from the algorithm. So we only need to show the second part.
If In the following, we prove that b+2 is also a lower bound of rounds for reaching Byzantine agreement. Specially, b + 2 is a tight bound for the case n max{2m + 2d, b + 1} + 2b. Proof: Suppose in contrary that there is a (b + 1)-round Byzantine agreement algorithm F . For any string w, we usew to denote the number corresponding to w with radix n.
Select an arbitrarily process p 0 in the system as a fixed transmitter. For 0 x n b+1 + 1, define α x : p 0 P 0:b → {0, 1} as for w ∈ p 0 P 0:b , α x (w) = 0 if w < x, 1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that α 0 (w) is always equal to 1, so F (α 0 ) = 1. For the same reason, F (α n b+1 +1 ) = 0. We claim: α x and α x+1 are views derived from a same scenario for all 1 x n b+1 . If so, by the agreement property of F we have
). This is a contradiction to F (α 0 ) = 1 and F (α n b+1 +1 ) = 0. Now it remains to prove the claim. For 1 x n b+1 , let x = q 0 q 1 . . . q b . Since n > b+3, there exists two different processes q b+1 and q b+2 (assume q b+1 > q b+2 without loss of generality) in P \{q 0 . . . q b }. Define a function σ : p 0 P 0:b+1 → {0, 1} as
It is easy to check that σ qb+1 = α x and σ qb+2 = α x+1 . If p 0 < q 0 , then σ(w) is always equal to 0. So α x and α x+1 come from an admissible scenario σ. If p 0 > q 0 , for the similar reason the claim is correct. If q 0 = p 0 , then for every process p in P \{q 0 , . . . , q b } we always have σ(wpq) = σ(wp). If the set {q 0 , . . . , q b } has less than b elements, then let B(σ) = {q 0 , . . . , q b } and σ is a (b + 1)-round scenario. Thus α x and α x+1 come from an admissible scenario σ. If the set {q 0 , . . . , q b } has b + 1 different elements, then let φ be as follows:
for w ∈ p 0 P 0:b+1 , φ(w) = 1 if w = q 0 . . . q b q with q < q b+1 and q = q b+2 , σ(w) otherwise.
φ is a (b + 1)-round scenario with Byzantine processes {q 0 , . . . , q b−1 } and d-faulty processes {q b }. Also we have φ qb+1 = σ qb+1 = α x and φ qb+2 = σ qb+2 = α x+1 . Thus α x and α x+1 come from an admissible scenario φ. Hence, the claim we mentioned is always correct. So the theorem follows. Now we show that b + 3 could be lower bound in certain cases. Specifically, suppose b = 0, we prove that 3 rounds is a lower bound.
Lemma 7. Suppose m, d > 0 and max{2m + d, 2d + m} < n < 2m + 2d, then there is no 2-round Byzantine agreement algorithm for a (n, m, d, 0)-system. Proof: Let F be a 2-round Byzantine agreement algorithm. Select an arbitrarily process p 0 in P as transmitter. By the assumption of the lemma, P \p 0 can be partitioned into four sets G, H, I and J such that |G| m − 1, |H| m − 1, 0 < |I| d, 0 < |J| d. We define two 2-round scenarios α (with d-faulty processes in G ∪ {p 0 }) and β (with d-faulty processes in H ∪ {p 0 }) as follows.
i. For every i ∈ I, j ∈ J, q i ∈ P \I, q j ∈ P \J let
In the construction, α i = β i for all i ∈ I. Thus for any i ∈ I,
giving a contradiction.
Concluding Remarks
There have been several attempts to overcome the need for three-times redundancy in Byzantine agreement [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Several researchers considered stronger communication models such as broadcast channels. In the synchronous setting, Rabin and Ben-Or [20] introduced the notion of global broadcast channel and showed that any multiparty computation could be achieved with two-times redundancy only. A partial broadcast channel was defined by Fitzi and Maurer [21] , and corresponding lower bounds for reaching Byzantine agreement were presented in [22] [23] [24] . Problems of secure communication and computation in the presence of a Byzantine adversary within an [3, 25] incomplete network have also been studied [3, 25] .
Accounting for the fact that communication failures sometimes dominate computation ones (due to the high reliability of hardware and operating systems), some models focused on communication failures [26, 27] or hybrid failures [12, 28] . These include models where the Byzantine components are the communication channels instead of (or in addition to) the processes. For instance, in [14, 29] , Santoro and Widmayer showed that agreement cannot be achieved with 
Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Consider a Byzantine agreement algorithm F for a (n, m, d, b)-system. Since n 2d+m+2b, P can be partitioned into five non-empty sets G, H, I, J and K, with |G| m, |H| d, |I| d, |J| b, |K| b. Select an arbitrarily process in G as transmitter p 0 . We define scenarios α and β recursively as follows:
i. For every h ∈ H, i ∈ I, q α ∈ P \H, q β ∈ P \I let α(p 0 ) = 0, α(p 0 h) = 1, α(p 0 q α ) = 0, β(p 0 ) = 1, β(p 0 i) = 0, β(p 0 q β ) = 1,
ii. For every g ∈ G, h ∈ H, i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K, p ∈ P , q α ∈ P \H, q β ∈ P \I, w ∈ p 0 P * , define the following values recursively on the length of w:
α(whp) = α(wg), α(wip) = α(wi), α(wkp) = α(wk), β(whp) = β(wh), β(wip) = β(wi), β(wjp) = β(wj), α(wgq α ) = α(wg), α(wgh) = β(wg), α(wjp) = β(wjp), β(wgq β ) = β(wg), β(wgi) = α(wg), β(wkp) = α(wkp).
It is easy to check that α is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine processes in J, and that β is a scenario of a (n,m,d,b)-system with d-faulty processes in G and Byzantine processes in K.
In the construction, α h = β h and α i = β i for all h ∈ H and i ∈ I. Thus for any h ∈ H, 0 = α(p 0 ) = F (α h ) = F (β h ) = β(p 0 ) = 1, giving a contradiction.
Appendix II. Byzantine Agreement with Signed Messages
We consider that processes send signed messages. Following [1] , a signed message satisfies the following two properties: 1) A non-Byzantine process's signature cannot be forged and any alteration of the content of its signed messages can be detected. 2) Any process can verify the authenticity of a process's signature. Formally, suppose σ is a k-round scenario for a (n, m, d, b)-system with signed messages. Let σ(p 0 p 1 . . . p i p) (i < k) be a message received by process p. If process p j (j i) is non-Byzantine, then either 1. σ(p 0 . . . p i p) = σ(p 0 . . . p j ), or 2. the signature of p j is forged. In this new setting, we have the following main result: 
